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Supreme Court Voting Behavior
2005 Term
By RICHARD G. WILKINS, SCOTT WORTHINGTON*,
JOHN J. NIELSEN**, AND PETER J. JENKINS****
I. Introduction
This Study, the twentieth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2005
Term.2 The analysis is designed to measure whether individual
Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
J. D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2007.
.... J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2008.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued
the Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991 Study]. The last thirteen Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2005 terms, have
been published in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995)
[hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994
Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et
al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996
Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997 Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999)
[hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998
Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001)
[hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000
Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247 (2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2001 Term, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (2003)
[hereinafter 2001 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002
Term, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. 0. 497 (2005) [hereinafter 2002 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2003 Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 769 (2005)
[hereinafter 2003 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2004
Term, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 909 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Study].
2. The 2005 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from
October 2005 through July 2006.
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Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. On such a point, members of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Federalist Society for Law
and Public Policy Studies might well disagree.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty.' By tracking the term-to-term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these ten categories,' and by
applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this Study
attempts to provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and projections regarding its past and future trends.
Whether statistical analysis of a complex and subjective process (such
as judicial decision-making) provides useful information may well be
debatable.6 But, within the limitations inherent in an attempt to
"number crunch" ideology, this annual survey offers students and
practitioners information that is useful for assessing how the Court or
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See
generally M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52
(1987) (discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions,
however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that
conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent change[s], respect for established
institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory
as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth
century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful [I of pluralism; certain
[] of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain [] of a desire to restrict
government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling.
See generally ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 157-58 (5th ed. 1994); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL
AND MODERN REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (2d ed. 1990). The Court's
method of selecting cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious
decisional process. Furthermore, reliable statistics generally require large quantities of
information to produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences become
more accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not
random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences below, therefore,
may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
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an individual Justice has voted-and may vote in the future-in
particular categories of cases.
II. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the
categories are based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First
Amendment and Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties
involved (i.e., state or federal government litigants).7 The tenth
category tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the
majority in cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint.
The tabulation of votes in these nine categories reveals, in broad
strokes, the frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as
a whole vote to protect individual rights8 or to exercise judicial
restraint.9
7. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of
its officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, religion, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7)
statutory civil rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing,
justiciability, and related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
8. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the
outcome of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those
detailing the resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal
Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in
Data Tables 1 and 2 also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against
persons asserting private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less
obviously relevant to individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of
federal and state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for
the state is to deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her
rights, and thus is counted as a conservative vote.
9. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism"
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From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking conservative or
liberal positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of government power as "conservative" and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual rights as "liberal." Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring
state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The
Study classifies all other votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases.' o Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor." Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial
restraint."
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn
precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant
because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states
within the federal system.
10. Unanimous cases may comprise a significant portion of the cases tabulated on
the various tables. This Term, for example, seven of eleven cases were decided
unanimously on Table 2, four of eight cases were decided unanimously on Table 4, six of
eleven cases were decided unanimously on Table 7; 10 of 16 cases were decided
unanimously on Table 8, and 8 of 16 cases were decided unanimously on Table 9.
11. An example of what seems to be a fairly non-controversial case for the court
was Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. 1613 (2006) (per curiam) (case was only four pages
long and decided by a per curiam-or unsigned-opinion).
12. For example, Justice Scalia voted against the federal government on four of the
eight cases tabulated on Table 4 (Federal/Criminal Cases) this Term. These votes result in
a voting record that is less "liberal" than anticipated. However, Justice Scalia's "concern
for individual rights" on Table 4 this year does necessarily suggest that he has abandoned
any commitment to "judicial restraint." Some of Justice Scalia's votes on Table 4 reflect
his preference for giving statutory language its "plain" or "ordinary" meaning. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). While "plain meaning" resulted
in a "liberal" voting pattern on Table 4, Justice Scalia's enthusiasm for "plain meaning"
may well flow from (rather than run contrary to) his conservative values. See, e.g.,
authority cited in note 3, above (noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and
violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support for elites and
hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical deductions").
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individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and
judicial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-
appears sound. 3 For example, deference to legislatures frequently
results in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action.14 Judicial restraint is
associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or statutes. 5 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter
to the state courts with their possible bias in favor of state
governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking
federal protection of rights.' 6 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's
basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative
outcomes are sound, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the
voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.17
To determine current ideological positions within the Court,
votes of the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by
other Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the
1986-2004 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the
Court as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes
of the Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10,
this information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the voting trends revealed over the years in the outcomes of
Majority, Split and Unanimous cases on each Table.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the
voting patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables
is to determine whether a Justice's 2005 Term voting record departs
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
14. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (holding that an employee
discharged from government employment did not have a First Amendment claim for
discipline connected with speech made related to his official duties).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006) (declining to
allow appeal of an order remanding a case to state court over argument that allowing the
order to stand would render that decision unreviewable).
17. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The Study's
general assumption that votes favoring individual rights reflect liberal views is almost
certainly not accurate in every case. For example, see Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (voting against the government on the
ground that the First Amendment protects political speech, including the right to spend
money supporting candidates for office). In this case, Justice Thomas-along with Justice
Scalia-racks up a "liberal" vote, even though some might assert that their votes reflect a
"conservative" value. See supra note 12.
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in a statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting
pattern and whether any significant correlation exists among the
Term-to-Term voting patterns of the Justices.'8
The Study also calculates an anticipated 2006 Term voting score
for each Justice on each Table. This statistic is calculated with an
Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting
model.'9 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where, as in this
Study, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast based
only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory
variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the
conservative and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor
analysis. This analysis tests the extent to which the Justices'
disposition of the cases on each of the first nine Tables may have
been influenced by liberal/conservative bias. Factor analysis has been
used in various empirical studies of human behavior, including
psychological inquiries into such personal traits as personality and
intelligence.2 ' The results of the factor analysis for the 2005 Term
appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against an absolute scale .
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be
interpreted with caution. The percentages and statistical results
revealed in each table are affected not only by the dispositions of the
individual Justices but also by the nature of the cases decided each
Term. Furthermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of
random selection and the universe of votes cast by the Justices is
relatively small. Since both random sampling and large sample size
are crucial elements of any fully reliable statistical analysis,
conclusions drawn from this Study are hardly beyond dispute. There
18. See infra.
19. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
20. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
21. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
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are obvious limitations to any empirical analysis of a subjective
decision-making process.22
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
leanings of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of
attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable, even though such
assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of
the attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved. This Study,
based upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering,
quantifying and analyzing data over time, should be substantially
more reliable than these ad hoc assessments.
1II. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2005 Term
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party
In 2005 the Court demonstrated liberal movement-an outcome
reversing the conservative movement on Table 1 in 2004. Two of the
past three Terms have evidenced liberal voting patterns and the
evidence on Table 1 for 2005 suggests that the liberal movement may
be notable. The voting patterns of six Justices were statistically
significant, with each voting more liberally than last year. The Court
as a whole, moreover, voted more liberally in the outcome of
Majority, Split and Unanimous cases than in 2004.
Nevertheless, and despite this statistically liberal movement, the
Court still sided with the government more than 50% of the time, as it
has for six of the past seven Terms. The Court still decides the great
majority of Civil Cases in favor of state governments. With the
arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito, Table 1
also demonstrates an increased level of conservative/liberal
polarization on the Court. In 2005 there was a 34 point gap between
the average scores of conservative Justices Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor/Alito, Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts and the more
liberal Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Last year-as
can be seen from Data Table 1 (O'Connor; includes only those cases
22. See supra note 6.
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voted upon by Justice O'Connor)-there was less than a six point gap
between Justice O'Connor (the fifth most conservative Member of
the Court in 2004) and Justice Souter. This data may suggest that the
newly composed Court could become more polarized in the decision
of cases tabulated on Data Table 1 than in the recent past.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party
The Court registered slight liberal movement on Table 2,
federal civil cases for the second straight year. In fact, five Justices
voted more liberally this Term than in 2004-and all five voting
patterns were statistically significant. The import of the liberal
movement on Table 2, however, is lessened by the fact that even the
most liberal member of the Court (who, somewhat surprisingly, is
Chief Justice Roberts) voted with the federal government 50% of the
time.
As with last Term, the rank order of the Justices is interesting,
with Justice Souter remaining one of the most conservative Members
of the Court. Chief Justice Roberts's position as the most liberal
Member of the Court in this category distinguishes his voting pattern
from that of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, who held a similar spot
on Table 2 only once in the past 10 years.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party
Factor analysis indicates that Table 3 provides the most reliable
evidence of conservative or liberal bias on the Court this Term, and
the movement (considered as a whole) is conservative. Majority,
Split, and Unanimous decisions all showed conservative movement
from the prior Term. Last Term's fairly substantial liberal movement
(in all but the outcome of Unanimous Decisions) was attributed to
Justice O'Connor's individual voting behavior.2 3 It appears that
Justice Alito's somewhat more conservative voting record on Table 3
(as compared with Justice O'Connor's voting behavior) may account
for this conservative movement. In 2004, Justice O'Connor voted for
the government about 54% of the time. In 2005, Justice Alito cast his
votes on Table 3 in favor of the government in 69.2% of the cases.
The impact of Justice Alito's voting behavior, however, is offset by
23. See discussion of Table 3, Section IV, infra. See also 2004 Study, 32 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 909, 940.
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the fact that-during her 2005 Term tenure-Justice O'Connor voted
with the State 85.7% of the time.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party
Table 4 evidenced liberal movement for the Court as a whole,
with interesting individual and group voting behaviors. Justices
Thomas and Scalia, both of whom were at record liberal voting
percentages in the 2004 Term, moved back toward their conservative
norms, although not as far as their mean voting percentages across all
prior Terms would predict. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg retreated
slightly from their liberal positions last Term.
Both of the new Justices (the Chief Justice and Justice Alito)
voted somewhat more liberally than the lifetime averages of the
Justices they replaced. All seven returning Justices also evidenced
statistically significant movements in their voting behavior on Table 4
(as compared with past Terms). Justice Thomas was the most
conservative Justice in Federal Criminal Cases, while Justices Souter
and Breyer tied for the most liberal Members of the Court, favoring
the federal government with only 12.5 % of their votes.
While Table 4 demonstrates liberal movement, this movement
may not be particularly noteworthy. Voting behaviors on Table 4
have been erratic and unstable over time. Majority, Split and
Unanimous issues were all decided slightly more liberally this Term
than last, but still did not move the Court substantially away from the
Court's 2004 posture. Whether this Term's voting behavior
represents greater stability in the outcome of federal criminal cases or
is merely a hiatus from the Court's continuing volatility in Federal
Criminal Cases is unclear.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association
and Religion
This Table showed conservative movement as a whole from the
prior Term. The outcomes on Table 5 remain volatile, partly because
of the few number of First Amendment questions that have come
before the Court: last Term there were only four issues tabulated and
this Term there were only six. Only Table 6, Equal Protection, has a
smaller data set.
Perhaps the most notable observation on Table 5 involves the
voting behavior of Justice Breyer. Despite a lifetime rating of voting
in favor of First Amendment claims only about one third of the time,
Summer 20071
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this Term Justice Breyer voted for First Amendment claims more
than any other Justice, in four of six cases.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
The Court only decided one equal protection claim this Term,
but a low number of cases on Table 6 is not unusual.2' The case
rejected the claim. 5 Although this is a rather striking conservative
outcome, its significance should not be overstated: because of the
small universe of cases Table 6 is (again) the least reliable indicator of
ideological bias. 6
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
The Court on Table 7 reversed the liberal trend of the last few
Terms, with the Court voting in favor of 54.5% of Statutory Civil
Rights Claims, down from last year's record high of 83.3%.27
However, because factor analysis ranks Table 7 as the second least
reliable indicator of ideological bias, drawing conclusions about the
Court's future behavior may be unwarranted.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
The Court largely held its ground on Table 8, with no change in
overall outcome (62.5% liberal) for the second year in a row. Justice
Kennedy was the only Justice to show a statistically significant change
in voting behavior. Justice Kennedy was also (somewhat un-
characteristically) the most liberal Justice on jurisdictional issues in
2005, a position he has not held in the past ten years.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
After stalling last Term, the liberal trend that began in
federalism cases in 2002 dramatically re-emerged: every Justice for
whom we have past measures exhibited a statistically significant
change in voting behavior, with all Justices charting liberal voting
patterns.' Unanimous cases reached the highest liberal level since
24. See supra note 1, prior studies.
25. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
26. See infra Section V.
27. See infra Data Table 7.
28. See Mean Table 9.
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1996, with every vote going against the states. 9  Majority cases
likewise reached their most liberal level since 1996, with less than
20% of decisions in favor of states.' Split cases only took a slight
liberal turn, and remain more conservative than even just two years
31ago.
According to factor analysis, Table 9 is the fourth most reliable
indicator of ideological bias this Term. Given the well-publicized
conservatism of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, one would
expect that this chart would reflect their conservative bias; however,
just the opposite is the case: they only sided with the states in these
cases about once in every five cases (18.2% and 22.2%, respectively).
Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen, but whatever
tack the trend takes in the future, it is evident that our prediction last
year that their views would "significantly alter" the outcomes in this
area 32 was justified.
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
The Court's slight liberal turn in the outcome of Swing Vote
Cases last year-with liberal coalitions controlling the outcome of
closely divided cases for the first time since 1998-did not last long.3
With the exception of last Term's liberal dip, the generally
conservative tenor of this chart continues as it has to varying degrees
since 1999) 4 The result this Term is almost a perfect mirror image of
last Term, as conservative outcomes went from 47.6% to 53.3% and
liberal outcomes from 52.4% to 46.7%. 35 The only two Justices to
evidence a statistically significant change in voting behavior
essentially balanced each other out, as Justice Kennedy voted slightly
more liberally, and Justice Ginsburg slightly more conservatively,
than expected 6 The anticipated voting behaviors of the individual
Justices were again fairly accurate, with seven voting within 10 points
of their projected scores.37
29. See Data Table 9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 922.
33. See infra Data Table 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See infra Mean Table 10.
37. See infra Data Table 10.
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IV. Analysis'
Data Table 1: Civil-State Party39
For the fourth year running, Data Table 1 provides the second
most reliable evidence of ideological bias on the Court'-and the
evidence all points in a liberal direction, albeit to a modest degree.
The Court (without statistical exception) reversed course from the
2004 Term, voting 11.2 points more liberally in the outcome of
38. Throughout Section IV, a footnote will list the cases tabulated on Tables 1-10.
An asterisk ("*-) preceding a case citation indicates that it appears more than once on
Tables 1 through 9. All cases on Table 10 appeared at least once on Tables 1 through 9.
A "slashed Y" (" V ") preceding a case citation indicates that more than one voting pattern
was tabulated for the case. See Appendix A ("A case is included more than once on the
same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the
issues are resolved by different voting alignments"). When more than one voting pattern
is tabulated for a case, a number-followed by an "x"-will follow the case citation. For
example, "(2x)" means that two voting patterns were tabulated for the case. Because
more than one voting pattern may be tabulated, some cases reflect both "liberal" and
"conservative" outcomes on different issues. Not every case decided by the Court is
included on Tables 1-10. If a case does not involve the federal or state government, or has
governmental entities on both sides, it may not be included on Tables 1-4. See Appendix
A (definitions). Cases are included on Tables 5-9 only when they involve questions
involving the subject matter of those Tables (First Amendment, Equal Protection,
Statutory Civil Rights, Jurisdiction and Federalism questions). Id. Table 10 tabulates the
outcome of all cases decided by a single vote. Id.
As a result of this classification scheme, not every Supreme Court opinion is included
in this Study. For 2005, the following cases did not fall within the Study's established
parameters: IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005); Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005); Martin v. Franklin Capital Co., 126 S. Ct. 704
(2005); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006);
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126
S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543 (2006); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med.
Servs., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006); Ebay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006);
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006); Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006)
(per curiam); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 2105 (2006);
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curiam).
39. *Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 529 (2005); *Cent. Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S.
Ct. 961 (2006); *Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam); Day v. McDonough,
126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006); *N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, Ga., 126 S. Ct. 1689
(2006); DaimerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006); *Ark. Dep't of Heath &
Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006); *Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); *Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); *Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006); *Arlington
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006); *¥ League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (3x); *Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
40. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 933 (indicating that year was the third in a row).
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Majority Cases, 3.1 points more liberally in Split Cases and 25.7
points more liberally in Unanimous Cases. The voting behavior of six
of the nine Members of the Court on Table 1 departed in a
statistically significant manner from past behavior.41 Moreover, the
behavior of all nine Members was more liberal in 2005 than in 2004.2
But, despite this uniform liberal movement, the outcome on
Table 1 for 2005 may not be terribly noteworthy. Indeed, the
unremarkable nature of the outcomes on Table 1 is evidenced in the
fairly close correlation between anticipated and actual voting
behaviors for the 2005 Term.43 The voting behaviors of five Justices
(Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, and Kennedy) were within 10
points of their anticipated scores, while the remaining three (Thomas,
O'Connor/Alito, and Scalia) voted within 20 points of their
anticipated scores. Given the statistical limitations of this Study,
these voting behaviors were remarkably stable.
Moderate individual liberal movement by most of the Justices
naturally resulted in moderate liberal outcomes with regard to other
statistical measures. The outcome of Majority Cases was 3.1 points
more liberal than anticipated.44 As for positioning, Justice Breyer is
the most liberal Justice on Table 1 for the first time since 2000. 4
Justice Thomas maintained his position as the most conservative
Justice on the Court in State Civil Cases, a position he has held or
shared for eight of the last eleven Terms. 6 Chief Justice Roberts's
score, which places him in second place among conservatives, seems
41. See supra Mean Table 1.
42. See supra Data Table 1.
43. See id. For two of the last three Terms, ARIMA forecasting has produced
reasonably accurate anticipated voting behaviors on Table 1 for the individual Justices and
the Court as a whole. In 2002, the Study anticipated the actual voting behavior of five
Justices within 10 points and the remaining four Justices within 21 points. See 2002 Study,
supra note 1, at 523 (Data Table 1). In 2003, the actual behavior of four Members was
within 10 points of their anticipated scores, with the remaining five Members voting within
20 points of their anticipated scores. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 782 (Data Table 1).
In 2004, by contrast, only one Member of the Court (Justice Ginsburg) voted within 10
points of her anticipated score, with two others (Justices Stevens and Souter) voting within
20 points of their anticipated scores. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at Data Table 1.
44. See id.
45. See id. (In 2002 there was "pole-switching" that resulted in a much more
"conservative" vote from Justice Stevens. In the 2000 Term Justice Breyer took the most
liberal position and Justice Stevens was in the second most liberal position.)
46. See id. (Justice Thomas shared the most conservative position on the court in
the 2001, 2000, 1998, and 1997 Terms. He held the position by himself in the 1995, 2002,
and 2004 Terms).
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to be in line with the voting patterns of his predecessor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who was the first or second most conservative Member of
the Court on Table 1 for seven of the last nine Terms.
In last Term's Study we opined that the rather significant
conservative movement in 2004 (among other things) possibly
resulted from an improvement in state advocacy before the High
Court.4 8  This year's data suggest that last year's conservative high
watermark may have been more anomalous than we thought (and
perhaps more a result of the facts of the cases selected by the Court)
because, in 2005, the outcomes on Table 1 returned to the voting
behavior evidenced (across time) on Chart 2.
Tables 1 (O'Connor) and 1 (Alito)-tabulating, respectively, the
voting behaviors of Justices O'Connor and Alito-may be notable. A
comparison of Table 1 (O'Connor) with 1 (Alito) suggests that Justice
Alito may pull the Court in a more conservative direction on Table 1
over time. This is possible because Justice O'Connor is the fifth most
conservative Justice on Table 1 (O'Connor), while Justice Alito is the
fourth most conservative Member of the Court on Table 1 (Alito).
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party
49
Data Table 2 also evidences liberal movement on the Court-
movement that may be more noteworthy than that on Table 1.
Majority, Split, and Unanimous cases in Federal Civil Litigation
reached liberal highs not seen since the 2000 Term.0 Six of the nine
Justices voted more liberally in 2005 than in 2004 (Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer). Notably, Chief
Justice Roberts voted more liberally than Chief Justice Rehnquist
had for seven years."
47. See id.
48. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 936.
49. United States v. Olson, 126 S. Ct. 510 (2005); Wi. Right to Life v. FEC, 126 S.
Ct. 1016 (2006) (per curiam); Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699 (2005); *Gonzales
v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); *Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006); *Dolan v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 126 S. Ct. 1252 (2006); Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S. Ct. 1613 (2006) (per
curiam); *Whitman v. Dep't of Transp., 126 S. Ct. 2014 (2006) (per curiam); Hartman v.
Moore, 126 S. Ct. 1695 (2006); Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006);
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006).
50. See supra Data Table 2.
51. Factor analysis does not suggest that Table 2 provides highly reliable evidence
of ideological bias this Term. See infra Factor Analysis (Data Table 2-Civil cases
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The importance of this movement is underscored by the fact
that five of the Justices exhibited statistically significant voting
behaviors this Term on Table 2, with all of them voting in a more
liberal direction.52 Four of these five (Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer) exhibited an identical voting pattern.53 Justice
Thomas, the fifth Justice with a statistically significant movement in
his voting behavior, also voted more liberally than in the past.
However, Justice Souter, as predicted, voted quite conservatively,
siding with the government in seven of eleven cases."
Not surprisingly, Unanimous Decisions this Term dropped from
their ten-year high mark in 2004. Though there are only 11 cases on
Table 2, a comparison of Table 2 (O'Connor) with Table 2 (Alito)
suggests that Justice Alito, as in Table 1, may be pulling the Court
in a slightly more conservative direction. Chief Justice Roberts,
however, demonstrated surprisingly liberal voting behavior, siding
with the government only half the time. Chief Justice Rehnquist
exhibited a similar voting pattern (i.e., holding the "most liberal
position" on Table 2) only once during the last ten years.
The voting blocs this Term, as last year, are an interesting
feature of Table 2. The three most conservative Justices are
O'Connor/Alito, Souter, and Thomas.55 After these "liberal" three,
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy cast 54.5%
of their votes for the government, with Justice Roberts-hardly the
most "liberal overall" Member of the Court-voting for the federal
government only half the time.56
The last two Studies emphasized the rather consistent
conservative nature of the Court in federal civil cases.57 Those
observations still hold true to some extent: since 1995 there have only
been 10 instances where any Justice has voted less than 50% of the
time for the federal government (half of those coming in 1997
involving the Federal Government as party-ranked in sixth place this year for reliability
with a score of -0.228).
52. See supra Mean Table 2 (Justices Breyer, Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens and
Souter).




57. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 794-95 (discussing the conservative strength of
the court for this category); 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 937 (same).
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alone)." The Majority has voted for the government at least 50% of
the time in eight of the last ten Terms. 9 There have only been three
instances since 1995 that the Court has decided Split cases less than
50% of the time for the government. 6° However, in 2005, the results
overall are more liberal than they have' been since 2000. If our
ARIMA analysis is correct, this trend will not continue next Term.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party62
This Table, according to factor analysis, provides the most
reliable evidence of conservative or liberal bias on the Court again
this Term.63  This Table shows clear conservative movement,
counteracting last year's liberal shift and reinstating a trend that has
dominated Table 3 since the 2001 Term." Only three Justices
(Stevens, O'Connor/Alito, Ginsburg) had statistically significant
shifts, but all were in a conservative direction.
As it is the most reliable predictor of ideological bias, it is not
surprising that the standard voting blocs emerge overall, with the
conservatives (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Scalia,
O'Connor/Alito, and Kennedy) siding with the government a
majority of the time and the liberals (Justices Stevens, Souter,
58. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at n. 57.
59. See supra Data Table 2 (the 1997, and 2000 Terms are the only two Terms
below 50%).
60. See id. (the 1997, 1999, and 2000 Terms).
61. See id.
62. Schriro v. Smith, 126 S. Ct. 7 (2005) (per curiam); Dye v. Hofbauer, 126 S. Ct. 5
(2005) (per curiam); Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 126 S. Ct. 407 (2005) (per curiam); Georgia v.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006); Bradshaw v. Richey, 126 S. Ct. 602 (2005) (per curiam);
Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006); Rice v.
Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969 (2006); *Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006); Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006); House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006); Hudson v.
Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006); YDavis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (2x);
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006); *Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006);
Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006); Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct.
1727 (2006); Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2097 (2006); Youngblood v. West Virginia, 126
S. Ct. 2188 (2006) (per curiam).
63. See infra Factor Analysis (Criminal State Cases rank highest on the chart with a
score of -0.852).
64. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 796 (Data Table 3 analysis in the 2003 Study
spoke of the "continuing and significant conservative trend on the Court.").
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Ginsburg, and Stevens) voting against government a majority of the
time.65
Some individual scores worth noting are Justices Scalia and
Breyer, whose voting behaviors were anticipated within two points of
their actual behavior. 66 Justice Thomas led the conservative bloc
again-a position he has held or shared for nine of the last ten
terms-with a slightly more conservative voting pattern than last
Term.67 On the other side, Justice Stevens has been in the most
liberal position nine of the last ten years in this category.'
The new Justices do not seem to have affected the Court's
overall voting behavior in State Criminal Cases, as Chief Justice
Roberts basically held suit for the late Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Roberts is tied for second most conservative voter on Table 3 this
year, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist was ranked in the top three
conservative voters every year for the past ten Terms. Justice Alito
likewise scored a voting pattern rather close to that of Justice
O'Connor.
Table 3 suggests some notable voting patterns by the Court and
individual Justices. For the Court as a whole, Table 3 suggests
conservative movement in Majority, Split, and Unanimous Cases.69 In
Majority Cases, the Court voted 19.6 points more conservatively than
last Term,' while Split Cases made a 22.3 point conservative jump,
effectively returning to 2003 levels.7' The conservative movement in
2004 appears to result from the increase in conservative voting
patterns of all but Justice Breyer. The Court overall maintained its
long tradition of voting at least 50% of the time for the government.72
The last time the Court voted less than 50% of the time for the
government in the outcome of Majority Cases on Table 2 was in the
1991 Term, when it voted for the state only 44.4% of the time.73
65. See supra Data Table 3.
66. See id.






73. See id. See also 1995 Study, supra note 1, at 15 (Data Table 3 continues this
Term's Table from 1995 back to 1988).
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State Criminal Cases, like Federal Civil Cases, tends to be a
category where the Court heavily favors the government.74  But,
unlike the voting patterns displayed on Table 2's tabulation of
Federal Civil Cases, Table 3's tabulations show a somewhat wider
range among the voting behaviors tallied by the individual Justices
over time.75 This may be one reason that Table 3 tends to provide
rather reliable evidence of bias. For the last 10 years, moreover,
Table 3 has evidenced clearly identifiable bloc voting, with the most
conservative Justices retaining Justice Kennedy's vote most of the
time.76
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party
77
Federal Criminal Cases rose from providing the fourth most
reliable evidence of ideological bias in 2004 to third this Term.7 ' The
movement indicated on the Table from the previous Term is modestly
liberal.
On the individual level, all seven returning Justices
demonstrated statistically significant changes in their voting behavior
this Term.79 All seven were more than 10 points away from their
anticipated outcomes.8'
Perhaps the most interesting voting behavior of any Justice on
Table 4 this Term was that of Justice Breyer-who made a somewhat
dramatic liberal jump.8' Not only was his movement from the
previous Term significant in terms of raw points (26), but his voting
pattern was far and away the most unanticipated (35.9 points more
74. See supra discussion of the Civil Federal cases and the amount of votes for the
government.
75. Compare Data Tables 2 and 3. As stated in the discussion regarding Data
Table 2, Justices rarely vote less than 50% of the time for the government on Table 3.
76. See supra Data Table 3.
77. United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006); Dixon v. United States, 126 S.
Ct. 2437 (2006); *¥Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (2x); Eberhart v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005) (per curiam); Salinas v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006)
(per curiam); Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006); United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
78. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at Section V; see also Section V below showing
this year's ranking.
79. See supra Mean Table 4.
80. See supra Data Table 4.
81. See id.
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liberal than expected).' Justice Breyer also showed a high degree of
correlation with Justice Souter. Chief Justice Roberts, in his first
term as Chief Justice Rehnquist's replacement, voted more
conservatively than the former Chief Justice had voted for the last
several years, voting in favor of the government only 50% of the time.
Justice Alito, who voted for the government 66.7% of the time, was
within Justice O'Connor's historical range of variation.
Other individual scores of interest include those of the Justice
Thomas, who replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist in the most
conservative position on the Court on Table 4-voting for the Federal
government in 72.7% of Federal Criminal Cases. 83 Chief Justice
Rehnquist held this position from 2001 until his final Term.' In 2003,
the Chief Justice shared the position with Justice Thomas. Justice
Thomas, however, demonstrated a remarkably liberal voting pattern
this Term, voting against the federal government 10.5 points more
often than his lifetime average would predict.85 The most liberal
position this Term was shared by Justices Souter and Breyer, who
each voted for the federal government in only 12.5% of the cases.86
As a whole, the Court evidenced modest liberal movement
away from last Term's marks.87 The outcome of Majority Cases
moved 8.7 points in a liberal direction, while the outcome of Split
Cases dropped from a 55.6% conservative result to a 50% win rate
for the government. The outcome in Unanimous Cases stayed
unchanged at 25% between 2004 and 2005.'
The outcome on Table 4 is the most stable in several years, as
the 1999 through 2004 Terms saw erratic behavior persisting on the
Court in Federal Criminal Cases.8 9 Over that period, the average
difference between Terms was 45.99 points.' Compare this rather








89. See supra Chart 4; see also supra Data Table 4.
90. This was calculated by taking the average of the absolute value of the
differences between Terms beginning with the difference between the 1999 and 2000
Terms (25.90) and including the difference between the 2003 and 2004 Terms (26.58). See
supra Data Table 4 for the numbers used to calculate.
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Terms, which was only 9.03 points, and with the rather tame 8.7%
variation between 2004 and 2005.91
Data Table 5: First Amendment Cases - Rights of Expression,
Association, and Religion9
This Table shows largely conservative movement from the
previous Term.93 This movement continues the brief conservative
movement noted last Term.4 But, as was stated the last two Terms:
"Any forecast of the future course of First Amendment law ...
seems problematic. '" 95 Last Term there were only four issues counted
on this table,96 and this Term there were only six.97 Nevertheless,
Table 5 presents some information of possible note.
Justice Breyer was the most liberal Justice on First Amendment
issues in 2005, a position he also achieved in the 2000 Term.98 Justice
Kennedy was the most conservative Justice, a position he also
occupied in 2002.
ARIMA analysis did not anticipate voting behaviors on Table 5
with great accuracy. 99 This result is unexceptionable, in light of the
few First Amendment issues addressed by the Court over time. In
fact, the only category of cases in this Study with a larger "99%
Confidence Interval for True Mean" is Table 6, Equal Protection
Cases."°
Five of the seven returning Justices' scores were statistically
significant this Term.'01 As for correlations, last Term's study noted
that the First Amendment voting behaviors of Justices Scalia and
91. Calculated the same was as described in the previous footnote.
92. *Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
& Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006); Hartman v. Moore, 126 S. Ct. 1695
(2006); *Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); *Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572
(2006); *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
93. See supra Data Table 5.
94. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 945 (Data Table 5 analysis).
95. Id.
96. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at Data Table 5.
97. See supra Data Table 5.
98. See id.
99. See id. (only one score within 10 points of anticipations).
100. See supra Mean Tables 1-10 (this assertion is based on the average of the
absolute values of the "99% Confidence Interval for True Mean" columns for each Mean
Table).
101. See supra Mean Table 5 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and
Breyer).
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Thomas were closely correlated.'9 That ranking has remained this
Term, with Justices Scalia and Thomas sharing an R2 statistic of 0.88
(the next highest correlation, between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
was .79).l 3
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Caseso'
The Court generally decides few, if any,1 5 equal protection cases
each Term, so it is not surprising that Table 6 has been, and remains,
the least reliable indicator of ideological bias on the Court, 16 as well
as one of the most volatile categories of cases analyzed by the Study.
This Term, as with the 2003 Term, the Court ruled on only one equal
protection claim. As the Court decided four such cases last Term,
ruling in favor of the claim 75% of the time, the Court's rejection of
the only Equal Protection claim this Term drops its percentage 75
points, to 0% liberal. The wide range in outcomes demonstrated on
Table 6 over time, as well as Table 6's relatively small statistical
sample, precludes firm assertions regarding any "ideological
direction" of the Court on equal protection issues.
Several pairs of Justices demonstrate rather strongly correlated
voting behaviors on equal protection questions, particularly among
the most conservative (Justices Thomas and Scalia, R2=0.92) and most
liberal (Justices Ginsburg and Souter, R 2=1.00-or perfect
correlation).
With nowhere to go but up, the Study anticipates that the Court
will move in a liberal direction during the 2006 Term, with the
Majority voting for 75.7% (rather than this Term's 0%) of the claims.
However, due to the volatility of Table 6 over time, as well as the fact
that Chief Justice Roberts' and Justice Alito's Supreme Court have
only one vote factored into the predictions, voting behaviors on
Equal Protection Claims are exceptionally difficult to anticipate with
any accuracy.
102. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 946.
103. See supra Regression Table 5.
104. *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
105. See, e.g., 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 316; see also 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 28.
106. See infra Part V.
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Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims07
The Court reversed the liberal trend regarding Statutory Civil
Claims that occurred the last two Terms, with the outcome in
Majority and Split Cases dropping to ruling in favor of the claim only
54.5% of the time, down from last Term's 83.3%.08 Table 7
demonstrates that the "classic" conservative/liberal bloc voting seen
on the Rehnquist Court continues on the Roberts Court. However,
Justice Kennedy now seems to control the outcome of these cases.
In 2004, the Court's most liberal Members (Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) all voted in favor of five Statutory
Civil Rights Claims, rejecting only one such claim (a claim
unanimously rejected by the Court).1" These four Justices each voted
for nine of the eleven claims presented in 2005; Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas favored these claims more
rarely. Justice Kennedy, with a slightly more liberal voting pattern,
appears to have a significant influence on the outcome of Statutory
Civil Rights claims, as his percentage of liberal decisions (54.5)
exactly matches the majority percentage.
Table 7 demonstrates rather closely correlated voting behaviors
by two pairs of traditionally liberal Justices (Justices Breyer and
Stevens R2=0.92; Justices Ginsburg and Souter R2=0.87). As the 2004
Study anticipated, all four of these Justices voted for Statutory Civil
Rights Claims more than 65% of the time. " '
Table 7 shows significant change from prior Terms. Split
decisions, which had steadily increased to 100% liberal last Term,
dropped dramatically, to 20% liberal this Term. Meanwhile, majority
decisions became significantly more conservative, dropping from
83.3% liberal to 54.5% liberal. Only cases decided by a unanimous
vote,"' with 83.3% of such cases decided in favor of the claim,
107. *United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006); *Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
126 S. Ct. 1195 (2006) (per curiam); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006); *YLeague of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (2x); *Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Weast, 126 S. Ct. 529 (2005); Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S. Ct. 1246 (2006);
*Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
108. See supra Data Table 7, Chart 7.
109. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
110. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at Data Table 7.
111. Note that some unanimous cases were decided with a Justice sitting out.
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continued the liberal trend shown since 2001 (interrupted only by
2004, which had no unanimous statutory civil rights cases). The
overall conclusion seems to be that Statutory Civil Rights Claims fare
poorly if decided by less than a unanimous vote. However, the low
reliability of Table 7 as an indicator of ideological bias (higher only
than Equal Protection cases on Table 6) cautions against relying too
much on inferences from the Table.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction'12
Table 8-considered as a whole--demonstrates continuation of
the Court's long-term liberal tendency to reject challenges to federal
jurisdiction. Table 8, particularly when examined over time, suggests
that the Court favors federal jurisdiction more often than not and that
the Court's liberal stance is fairly stable. With the exception of 1999,
when an unusually high number of jurisdictional challenges were
rejected, the outcomes of Majority Cases on Table 8 have fluctuated
within a relatively narrow range of 52.2% to 66.7%."'
For 2005, the outcome in Majority Cases was identical to the
2003 and 2004 Terms, with the Court accepting 62.5% of all claims
favoring federal jurisdiction."4
For the third year in a row,"5 the voting behaviors anticipated
by the Study were fairly accurate, both for the individual Justices and
the Court as a whole (an outcome that may reinforce our
observations regarding the Court's established liberal stance on
jurisdictional issues). The actual voting behavior of six of the seven
returning Justices (Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, Thomas,
Stevens, and Breyer) fell within ten points of their anticipated scores.
112. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 126 S. Ct. 606 (2005); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt,
126 S. Ct. 941 (2006); Will v. Hallock, 126 S. Ct. 952 (2006); *Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct.
1198 (2006) (per curiam); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 126 S. Ct. 1252 (2006); Oregon v.
Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006); Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006); *Kansas v.
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006); *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Unitherm
Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006); Ministry of Def. & Support for the
Forces of Iran v. Elahi, 126 S. Ct. 1193 (2006) (per curiam); DaimerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006);
Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006).
113. See supra Data Table 8.
114. See infra Chart 8.
115. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 950.
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The outcome in Majority Cases in 2005, furthermore, was only 3.8
points less liberal than anticipated by the Study in 2004. " '
The voting pattern of Justice Kennedy this Term is rather
interesting, seeming to run counter to his supposed ideological
leanings. He was the most liberal Member of the Court this Term
with regard to expanding federal jurisdiction. 17 His was also the only
statistically significant change in voting behavior.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases118
Tables 9 and 4 (Federal Criminal Cases) again switched places
this Term as the fourth and third most reliable indicator of ideological
bias as measured by factor analysis. 9 The Court moved liberally in
deciding the outcome of all categories of cases, with Majority, Split,
and Unanimous cases dropping 19.3, 10, and 25 points, respectively.
Because of our assumption that ideology plays a more significant role
in the outcome of Split Cases than Unanimous Cases,120 Table 9
suggests liberal movement (with the Court favoring the federal rather
than state government) in the decision of federalism issues in 2005.
This runs contrary to the common assumption that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito would tend to drive the Court in a
generally, if not uniformly, conservative direction.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy went from last to first in this
category compared to last year: after voting for the state in the fewest
percentage of cases last term (25%), he now is tied for first in siding
with the states (41.7).121
ARIMA forecasting did not anticipate the voting behavior of
individual Justices very accurately, as none of the Justices' actual
behaviors fell within 10 points of their anticipated scores122 None of
116. See supra Data Table 8.
117. Id.
118. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 126 S. Ct. 606 (2005); *United States v. Georgia,
126 S. Ct. 877 (2006); *Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006); Alaska v.
United States, 126 S. Ct. 1014 (2006); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct.
1204 (2006); N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, Ga., 126 S. Ct. 1689 (2006); Jones v.
Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006); *Ark. Dep't of Heath & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 126 S.
Ct. 1752 (2006); *Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
904 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006);
*Youngblood v. West Virginia, 126 S. Ct. 2188 (2006) (per curiam).
119. See Section V, below.
120. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Data Table 9.
122. Id.
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the actual scores for this Term or the predicted scores for next Term
rise to the level of even half of cases being decided in favor of states."
That being the case, it could mean that the newly emerging Roberts
court could effectively end any progress the Rehnquist court made in
shifting power to the states.
There are two areas, however, where state governments appear
to have continuing regulatory leeway: recognition of individual
autonomy and imposition of the death penalty. Regarding autonomy,
the Court held that the United States Attorney General could not
prosecute Oregon doctors who performed assisted suicide that was
authorized under state law, leaving such a choice to the states rather
than the federal government.'24 The Court also seems willing to
tolerate greater diversity in state criminal law, as it upheld Kansas'
capital sentencing scheme, allowing for a sentence of death when
aggravating and mitigating factors were in equipoise.'25 Outside of
these areas, however, it does not appear that the states will find much
favor in the future, particularly given the historically liberal nature of
these cases and the departure of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, who have tended to protect state sovereignty.
2
1
Analysis of recent years provides evidence of the Court's
emerging liberal inclinations on federalism issues. The Court rejected
claims of state authority in ten instances, and ruled in favor of the
state twice-suggesting liberal movement in the overall outcome of
the twelve cases. But numbers alone do not indicate the development
of the federalism case law. Six of the ten federalism issues (compared
with three of six last Term'27) decided against state power involved
unanimous decisions, 12 while no federalism issues were decided
unanimously in favor of the state. Under the presumptions of this
Study, these six unanimous outcomes are less likely to be motivated
123. Id.
124. Gonzales v. Oregon 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
125. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
126. See, e.g., 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 807.
127. See 2004 Study, supra note 1 at Data Table 9.
128. See supra Data Table 9; The six cases with unanimous decisions against state
power were: Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 126 S. Ct. 606 (2005); United States v. Georgia,
126 S. Ct. 877 (2006); Alaska v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1014 (2006); N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Chatham County, Ga., 126 S. Ct. 1689 (2006); Ark. Dep't of Heath & Human Servs. v.
Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126
S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
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by the ideological leanings of individual Justices.12 9 As a result, the
primary indications of bias on Table 9 this Term should be derived
from an examination of the outcome of Split Cases-where six
federalism issues each were decided almost evenly between the
conflicting assertions of state and federal power: two cases for13° and
four cases against state power.
As noted above, this outcome in Split Cases results in a 16.7-
point liberal movement from last Term. This quantitative decrease in
the Court's conservative support of the states signals decreased
receptivity to assertions of state regulatory power, particularly when
one considers the nature of the issues decided in favor of the states in
split decisions during 2004, and compares those cases with the nature
of the issued involved in the split decisions against the state.
The two split decisions favoring the state involved questions of
autonomy and criminal procedure, where the Court was hesitant to
displace state authority on the basis somewhat ambiguous federal
statutes.132 But, once beyond its hesitancy to displace state authority
without a clear congressional mandate, the Court seemed quite
willing to limit state power in favor of federal regulatory authority.
The four split decisions decided against the state restricted state
authority to regulate arbitration provisions in contracts, 3 state notice
for tax sales,'3 ' to determine if evidence is exculpatory or merely
impeaching,' 35 and to assert sovereign immunity through a state
129. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
130. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006); *Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378
(2006).
131. *Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006); Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006); Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006);
*Youngblood v. West Virginia, 126 S. Ct. 2188 (2006) (per curiam).
132. Gonzales involved a state law permitted assisted suicide; Woodford involved
state prison conditions.
133. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006), the Court
held that whether a contract containing an arbitration provision was illegal was for an
arbitrator, rather than state courts, to decide.
134. In Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006), the Court held that, as a matter of
due process, states had to take "additional reasonable steps" beyond mailing notice to
ensure that homeowners know of an impending tax sale of their home.
135. In Youngblood v. West Virginia, 126 S. Ct. 2188 (2006), the Court held that
defendant had made a valid Brady claim by putting forth an explicit note from one of his
alleged victims regarding his alleged abuse, overruling the state court determination that
the evidence was useful for impeachment purposes, but not exclupatory.
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agency.'36 These cases arguably indicate a stall-if they do not spell
the end entirely-to what some scholars had identified as the
Rehnquist Court's federalism-based "revival" of state regulatory
authority.1
7
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Analysis: Who Votes Most Often With
the Majority in Close Cases?
38
Cases decided by a single vote (which most often involve 5-4
decisions, but also include other circumstances where a change in a
single vote would alter the outcome, such as a 5-3 vote to reverse) fall
into the "swing vote" category and generally provide reliable
evidence of ideological trends on the Court.'39 Many previous
editions of this Study demonstrate that Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy have tended to be the "leaders" in casting the decisive vote
in closely divided cases,' and they continued to be so this term.
In 2005, Justice O'Connor was the only Justice who voted with
the majority both times in the two cases she heard in this category."'
Justice Kennedy, although ranked below Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices O'Connor and Alito on Table 10, voted 10 times with the
136. In Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006), the Court held that
bankruptcy proceedings involving transfers to state agencies did not bar suit against the
state agencies under sovereign immunity.
137. The court's decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), were implicated in Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005). The majority narrowed the scope of Lopez and Morrison largely by focusing
upon and reviving a post-Depression Era decision, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)-a case whose reasoning had been undercut by the analysis of the two more recent
opinions. Gonzales seems to signal that a new voting coalition on the Court is rethinking
the "revival" of state regulatory authority within the federal system. Compare, Jesse H.
Choper, "Taming Congress' Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near
Future Portend?" 55 ARK. L. REV. 731 (2003); Steven G. Calabresi, "Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense," 574 Annals 24 (2001).
138. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006); Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct.
1708 (2006); Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006); YLeague of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (2x); YHamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)
(2x); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006); Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006); Day
v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006);
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S.
Ct. 2557 (2006); Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
139. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 36,2002 Study, supra note 1, at 521.
140. See 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 318, 326, 331; 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 259;
1999 Study, supra note 1, at 605; 1998 Study, supra note 1, at 434, 489; 1997 Study, supra
note 1, at 597.
141. See supra Data Table 10A.
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majority. Justice Kennedy's 66.7% score (below the 69.2% voting
pattern earned by Chief Justice Roberts and the combined decisions
of Associate Justices O'Connor and Alito), results from the fact that
he cast 15 total votes on Table 10 (10 with the majority and 5 with the
dissent) while Chief Justice Roberts and Justices O'Connor and Alito
cast only 13 such votes (nine with the majority and four with the
dissent). Justice Kennedy would likely have held the top spot on
Table 10 had Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito not had to
recuse themselves in one case each.' 2
Nevertheless, and despite the obvious continuing influence of
Justice Kennedy in the outcome of closely divided cases, Chief Justice
Roberts (along with Justices O'Connor and Alito) voted (as a
statistical matter) most often with the majority. 143 Justice Alito's
influence in this category will likely be felt more fully next Term
because he will participate in (presumably) most or all of the cases.
All this runs counter to our prediction last term" 4 that Justice
Thomas would take the lead in this category; in fact, he tied for fourth.
4
1
Overall, however, our predictions were fairly accurate, as seven justices
(Justices O'Connor and Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg,
Stevens, Breyer) voted within 10 points of their predicted scores.
46
For the sixth time in seven Terms, the outcome of Swing-Vote
Cases was determined by a conservative voting bloc, 147 returning to
the conservative trend which began in 1999. Only Justices Ginsburg
and Kennedy demonstrated statistically significant movement this
Term, and appear to have balanced each other out, as Kennedy
moved slightly liberal and Ginsburg slightly conservative. The Study
correctly anticipated a return to conservative control, aided, no
doubt, by the strong positions on this chart held by the relatively
conservative Chief Justice Roberts and Justices O'Connor and
Alito.
149
142. For Chief Justice Roberts, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); for
Justice Alito, Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006).
143. See supra Data Table 10.
144. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 954.
145. See supra Data Table 10.
146. Id.
147. See supra Chart 10.
148. See supra Mean Table 10.
149. Id.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some
categories turn out to be more reliable indicators of ideological
tendencies than others.
The reliability of the various tables in this study can be
influenced by many factors, including the particular makeup of the
Court's caseload and small sample size. Equal protection cases in
Data Table 6, for example, tend to make up a small portion of the
court's workload each term" ° and are consistently the least reliable
indicator of ideological bias.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate between
the voting patterns of more liberal and more conservative Justices, we
have applied a statistical tool known as factor analysis."' In applying this
tool, we have determined that a primary factor may be extracted from
the Study's categories over the entire life of the Study that accounts for
more of the variance revealed by the data on Tables 1 through 9 than
any other factor.12 We interpret this "Factor 1" as liberal/conservative
bias simply because that is what this Study purports to measure. The
categories currently load onto Factor 1 as follows:
150. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 37; see also supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
151. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 564.
152. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.













According to this ranking, Table 3 (Criminal/State Party) cases
are again the most reliable indicator of liberal/conservative leanings
over time; in fact, the ranking established by Factor Analysis is
identical to that from last Term's analysis, except that Table 9
(Federalism) has moved back behind Table 4 (Criminal/Federal
Party) and Table 2 (Civil/Federal Party) has passed up Table 8
(Jurisdiction). 3 Tables 1, 3, 4, and 9, as expected, remain relatively
reliable indicators of ideological bias, while the remaining five
continue to be of questionable value in that regard.
As we noted in the 2004 Study,'54 these results may seem
counter-intuitive to those holding a stereotypical understanding of the
Court-that issues relating to the First Amendment, Statutory Civil
Rights, and Equal Protection would (seemingly) provide nearly
perfect opportunities for the Justices to show their ideological
leanings. However, as we have discussed in three prior studies,'55 such
cases often involve "pole-switching," where Justices vote
"conservatively" (under the definitions of this Study) in order to
further a "liberal" policy preference, or vice versa.16
153. 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 961.
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Frontier Analysis with Justice O'Connor
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Frontier Analysis with Justice O'Connor, continued
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Frontier Analysis with Justice Alito
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Frontier Analysis with Justice A lito, continued
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Frontier Analysis with Justice Alito, continued
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Frontier Analysis Combined with Justice O'Connor and Justice Alito
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Frontier Analysis Combined with Justice O'Connor and Justice Alito, continued
FRONTIER ANALYSIS CHART I
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their
validity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's
selection of which cases it will decide. With varying parameters such
as these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.157
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores
rather than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are
defined by the highest and lowest scores in each category and each
combination of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative
to the established frontier. By adjusting the relative weights
allocated to each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect
each category's reliability-as determined by the factor analysis
described in Section V.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court
in Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Analysis Charts 1-4.
Two versions of each frontier are presented.
In Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights
applied to each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy in
Part V. On these Tables, weights are chosen for each Justice that
produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the
limitation that Equal Protection (the least reliable category) cannot
receive more weight than Civil/Federal Party (the next least reliable
category), Civil/Federal Party cannot receive more weight than
Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth, moving upward from the least
reliable category set out in Part V.
157. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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Frontier Analysis Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting constraints
at all; instead, these tables choose, for each Justice, those weights that
present him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible.
Each Table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those
with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category
weight distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than
100% indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice
could obtain with optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated
percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal
combination of weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This
condition is known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts
when present.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores
for each Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near
the bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices as they
replace outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices'
scores are not indicated, they contributed to the determination of the
liberal and conservative frontiers during Terms in which they sat on
the Court.
Frontier Analysis Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
constrained frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are
easier to read than the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the
Justice's relative positions and score ranges overall. They do not,
however, show any trend information.
According to the Frontier Analysis Table 1, "Conservative
Frontier-Constrained," Justice Thomas retained his position as the
most conservative Justice for the second consecutive term.18 Justice
Thomas was also again the only Justice this Term to reach the
conservative frontier on the constrained Frontier Analysis Table,159
with a superefficient score of 111%. This is an interesting score
because it is calculated by weighting the tables according to factor
analysis."' Justice Scalia came in second on this table, with a score of
97%, but Chief Justice Roberts was a very close third at 96%. T
Justices Stevens (51%) and Breyer (48%) were the least conservative
158. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
159. See id.
160. See Factor Analysis section for rankings. See also supra Frontier Analysis Table 1
(Justice Thomas is only measured on Civil/State, Criminal/State, and Federalism).
161. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
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Justices on the constrained Frontier Analysis Table.16 The rankings
on this Table shifted substantially this year, after two years of
relatively little change.1 63
Frontier Analysis Table 2, which shows the results from of a
constrained calculation of the liberal frontier, shows two Justices with
superefficient scores: Justices Stevens (107%) and Breyer (107%).'
64
Justice Thomas, as with Frontier Analysis Table 1, remained the least
liberal Justice (51%).165
Like last Term, the 2005 Term lines up "the usual suspects" in
terms of ideology, though the rankings are not mirror images of each
other. As we noted last term, arguably more "consistent" results on
Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2 may be the result of fewer cases
involving "pole-switching" behavior and, accordingly, the Justices
showed their "true" biases more accurately this Term. Though only
Justices Scalia and Thomas had identical rankings on Frontier Tables
1 and 2, the slight change of positions for the other Justices on the
two Tables may well be of minimal importance.1
In 2003, the unexpected switch in rankings across Frontier
Tables 1 and 2 was attributed to the theory "that Justices Scalia and
Thomas are not as bound to conservative or liberal ideologies as
other Members of the Court" and therefore their voting patterns
"demonstrated conservative and liberal patterns, as the constrained
Frontier Analysis Tables demonstrate."' 67 While this may still be true,
another theory explored last Term was that the switch in expected
ranking was due to "pole-switching," voting behavior that was in
substantial evidence in the 2003 Term.'6
162. Id.
163. Justice Breyer, the least conservative Justice this year, scored a 77% in 2003
and 2004. See 2003 and 2004 Studies, supra note 1, at Frontier Analysis Table 1. It is
important to note that these numbers are not comparable year to year, however. The
frontier is different every year. Therefore, the "quantity" that 77% represents may be
more or less than the previous Term. What is comparable however is how close the
Justices come to the frontier in a given year. An analogy would be comparing LSAT
scores of students who took different tests (e.g., one takes the October test and another
takes the February test).
164. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
165. See id. Frontier Analysis Table 2; compare 2003 Study, supra note 1, at Frontier
Analysis Table 2.
166. See supra Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2. Justice Souter is the "least conser-
vative" Justice but is only second place on the liberal table.
167. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 817.
168. See 2004 Study, supra note 1, at 964.
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The unconstrained Frontier Analysis Tables maximize the
effects of pole-switching and other potentially "distorting" voting
behaviors and, therefore, do not provide very reliable evidence of
conservative or liberal bias. The real importance of the
unconstrained Tables is that they illustrate the value of the
constrained analysis and the importance of factor analysis.69
It is interesting to note that some Justices are unable to reach
either the unconstrained conservative or liberal frontiers-regardless
of the combination of weights used to enhance their conservative and
liberal voting tendencies. On Frontier Analysis Table 3, the
unconstrained conservative table, two Justices fell short of the
frontier, Justice Stevens by seventeen points, and Justice Breyer by
eighteen points. Every other Member of the Court reached the
conservative frontier, with three (Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and
O'Connor/Alito) marking superefficient scores. " ° On Unconstrained
Frontier Analysis Table 4, six Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices
Breyer, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Kennedy) had superefficient
scores.'7' This outcome may evidence that the data for 2005 is
somewhat less reliable than in 2004 and more akin to 2003, when, as a
result of significant pole-switching behavior, all of the Justices
reached the liberal frontier on the unconstrained analysis.
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VII. Conclusion
The voting patterns tabulated by the 2005 Study reveal (as
should be expected) a Court in transition. The generally consistent
conservative voting patterns of Chief Justice Rehnquist have been
replaced with several surprisingly liberal voting patterns tallied by
Chief Justice John Roberts (who was the most liberal Member of the
Court on Table 2, and who voted more liberally on Tables 4 and 9
than the historical practice of the past Chief Justice). Associate
Justice Alito voted rather more conservatively on Table 3 than the
historic patterns of Associate Justice O'Connor (whom he replaced
on the Court), As a result, Table 3-this Term's most reliable
indicator of ideological bias-demonstrates a significantly wider
169. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 818 ("The unconstrained Frontier Tables
amplify the effects of pole-switching. Accordingly, the most reliable evidence of ideology
on these Tables comes from the constrained analysis.").
170. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 3.
171. See supra Frontier Analysis Table 4.
172. See 2003 Study, supra note 1, at 818.
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"gap" between the conservative and liberal wings of the Court than in
the recent past. The overall-all conservative impact of Justice Alito,
however, is tempered by the fact that (as with the new Chief Justice)
he demonstrated fairly consistent liberal voting behavior on Tables 4
and 9.
The ideological posture of the Court-considered as a whole-
is difficult to reckon. Five Tables demonstrate conservative
movement (Tables 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10), while five Tables demonstrate
liberal movement (Tables 1, 2, 4, 8 and 9). In some sense, therefore,
the Court could be described as "in equipoise" between classically
liberal and conservative outcomes. A closer look at the data,
however, suggest that liberal outcomes are gaining momentum on the
Court, although an increasingly polarized conservative wing may (for
the foreseeable future) control the outcome of closely divided five-to-
four decisions.
Factor Analysis demonstrates that the liberal movement on
Tables 1, 4 and 9 may be significant. Table 1, tabulating the outcome
of state civil cases, is the second most reliable indicator of ideological
bias this Term. Table 1, furthermore, has shown liberal movement
for two of the past three Terms. Accordingly, the Court may well be
more inclined to cast liberal votes in civil cases involving state
governments.
Table 4, collecting votes in federal criminal cases, is the third
most reliable indicator of ideological bias this Term, while Table 9
(involving the division of power between state and federal authority)
is the fourth most reliable indication of bias. These Tables (perhaps
most surprisingly Table 9) demonstrate liberal movement. Indeed,
the results tabulated on Table 9 suggest that the purported "revival of
federalism" championed by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist may
have come to an end.
Taken together, the liberal voting patterns on these Tables
suggest that the Court is rather liberally inclined to the exercise of
federal judicial power, somewhat unreceptive to claims of state
(rather than federal) regulatory authority, and quite likely to vote
against the federal government in criminal matters. This is not the
voting behavior one might expect from a classically conservative
Court.
Balanced against this relatively impressive liberal movement are
the outcomes on Tables 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10. As a statistical matter,
however, much of this conservative movement is hardly noteworthy.
The results tabulated on Tables 5 (First Amendment), 6 (Equal
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Protection) and 7 (Statutory Civil Rights) are particularly
unreliable-involving few cases and historically volatile voting
patterns.
The conservative outcomes on two Tables, however, are
notable. Table 3, which summarizes the outcomes of state criminal
cases, is the most reliable indicator of ideological bias in the 2005
Term-and the conservative movement charted on the Table is
significant. Table 3, furthermore, demonstrates a wide ideological
gap between the five most conservative Members of the Court and
the four most liberal. This ideological gap-coupled with the
statistical reliability of Table 3 as an indicator of ideological bias-
may well explain the outcome on Table 10 for 2005.
In the 2004 Term, a liberal coalition of Justices controlled the
outcome of just over 54% of all issues divided by a five-to-four vote.
This Term, a conservative coalition controlled the outcome of 53.3%
of all closely divided cases. Considered together, Tables 3 and 10
suggest that-although the Court as a whole is casting liberal votes in
a rather broad range of cases (particularly those involving federal
jurisdiction and the division of power between the states and the
federal government)-the newly composed Court is highly polarized
in the decision of cases involving ideological issues (Table 3). In 2005,
this conservative wing controlled the outcome of more than half of
such cases. The question for the future is whether the conservative
coalition on Table 10 will retain the upper hand, or whether the
overall (and rather general) liberal voting behavior on the Court will
overtake (and eventually control) the outcome of the Nation's most
contentious cases.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided
by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if
accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition
are included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the
Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a
four-four vote resulting in affirmance without written opinion have
been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium opinions are
considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than
perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories
are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a
problem of classification. No cases in 2005 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties - Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials or, with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included if that official is represented by government
attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly
implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if
governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. 73 If
both a state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the
same side with only private parties on the other, the case is included
on Data Tables 1 and 2. A case is included more than once on the
173. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005)
(excluded because a sovereign Indian tribe was on one side of case and a sovereign state
government was on the other).
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same table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting the
outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting
alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue - Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and other civil rights
statutes expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex, religion, age or physical handicap. Actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right
asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue involves the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. However, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted is
based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to that
constitutional right. 7 4 The purpose of this exclusion is to preserve the
distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness,
abstention, equitable discretion and justiciability. Jurisdictional
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
174. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006)
(right to abortion based on Supreme Court's interpretation of Constitution, not federal
statute).
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member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal
and state or local governments. Common examples of these issues
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government
action and federal court interference with state court activities (other
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal"
federalism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the
dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
are excluded from the table.
5. The Swing-Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that
reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the
majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a
tie vote. Reversals by a vote of five-two are also not included, as
four-three reversals, though disfavored, are valid.' A case is
included more than once in the table if it raises two or more distinct
issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved
by different voting alignments.




This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. The following
sections explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and
how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments. For example, a category including ten cases
during the term will have the potential for eleven different scores
(0% through 100%, in 10% increments), while a category with only
one case during the Term will provide only two score possibilities
(0% and 100%).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model. 76 This
model is useful in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single
variable (a Justice's score) is to be forecast based only on its present
and prior values with no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an
acronym for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average. The
model is most easily explained by starting in the middle of the
acronym:
Integrated: This term refers to a differencing process which
operates in a manner similar to differentiation of a
continuous function in calculus. The goal is simply to
remove trend from the time series data by subtracting
each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time
176. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see Peter Kennedy, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
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series. This operation may be repeated successively
until a trendless or "stationary" series results. Our
model employs only one differencing operation.
Auto-Regression:
Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be determined.177 This
parameter seeks to relate each data point in the
stationary series to the data point immediately
preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X = AX,.,
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is
the autoregressive parameter, and X,, is the value of
the data series point immediately preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points,
however, a single parameter will almost never
precisely produce the relationship just described for all
data point pairs. Some error is inevitable. We
therefore seek to determine that parameter which
produces the least total error when applied to the
entire series.178
Moving Average:
A second parameter is determined that relates the
value of each series element X, to the error between
the estimated value and the actual value of the
previous element X,-. That is:
X, = -Bx,,
177. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and
MA models.
178. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
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where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The
value of this parameter is also optimized to minimize
its total error when applied to the series.
Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,--Bx,.,+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining
between the calculated and actual values of X,. This
final equation is used to predict the series score for the
upcoming Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"17 9 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X,). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.18° We hypothesize that X, is also
the true mean of the population V, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
Ho: p = X, The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not significantly
shift [t from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are statistically equivalent.
H: p X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly shifts
V from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are not statistically
equivalent.
179. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE &
GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993).
See also CRAIG AND HOGG, supra note 33.
180. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
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We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a
certain confidence interval,18' by rejecting the null hypothesis.' 82 This
is accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2-,u
s / F
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (.)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k). is3 If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, Ho is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an
upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting
percentages of the Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show only a very
weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely
scattered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant
correlations between and among Justices' Term-to Term voting
percentages are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in
each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number is
an r 2 statistic, which is a more reliable measure of the actual level of
correlation
181. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X 2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction), * = .025.
182. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see MOORE AND MCCABE, supra note 131.
183. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
184. The r2 statistic is an estimate of o2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r 2 value in the
tables is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
[Vol. 34:4
Summer 20071 SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 2005 TERM
Equal Protection Cases y = 0.717x + 7,4944
R2 = 0.7921
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Figure 2
The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two
Justices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It
simply means that their scores tend to move up and down together
from one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way
implies causation.
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E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who
attempt to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by
using batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by
extracting a single factor, using principal components analysis and
applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the
theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the
scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject are available
that provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex
185process.
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of







Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while
Debbie would argue that the best marbles player should win because
each has scored highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty
would argue that each sport should receive equal weight, because her
combined score with equal weightings would be higher than either
Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7,
while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score
4.5, and Debbie would score 5.5. The following figure plots the
athlete's scores graphically:
185. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed.
1990).
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A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at
100% of the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to
the extent her point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two
points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient
to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the
points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the
frontier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet.
However, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C
"looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this appendix.
Summer 20071
590 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34:4
